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Abstract 
In this age of globalization, municipal concerns impinge negatively or 
positively on the fate of or future of other nations.  Piracy in Somalia has 
moved from a domestic concern to an international one and the country is 
largely unable to discharge its responsibilities to its citizens and thus 
incapable of effectively meeting its international treaty obligations.  Piracy in 
Somalia thus impedes maritime operations along the East African coast of 
the Indian Ocean.  One concerted international response to the maritime 
criminality in that part of the world is operation Atalanta.  This paper uses 
the realist theoretical framework to argue that this EU effort serves the 
commercial and strategic interests of nations that benefit directly and 
indirectly from maritime trade.  But the essentially military response to 
piracy which EU NAVFOR Somalia stands for will not bring a sustainable 
solution to the problem since some of the pirates see their activities as pure 
survival strategy.  It therefore suggests the diplomatic option to re-build the 
failed Somali State – so that the state of Somalia can discharge its 
responsibilities to its citizens as well as the international community, stopped 
illegal fishing in Somali waters and effectively check illegal dumping of 
chemical and industrial waste in that region. 
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Introduction 
Trans-border criminality in any part of the world is unacceptable under any 
guise.  This is especially so in the age of globalization when otherwise 
domestic concerns of a nation impinge negatively or positively in the fate or 
future of other nations.  Piracy in Somalia is one such negative international 
scourge.  It impedes maritime operations along the East African coast of the 
Indian Ocean.  The implications of this are far reaching.  Consequently, this 
paper sets out to analyze the main currents of piracy off Somali territorial 
waters in order to better galvanize constructive international response to the 
scourge and thus boost maritime business and enhance world economy 
through genuine reconstruction of a failed state.  To effectively do this we 
will first present an overview of Somalia as a sovereign state and the 
European Union’s Operation Atlanta launched to check piracy in the sub 
region. 
The Problem 
International maritime criminality is a global concern (Wadhams, 2008: 
http//new.nationalgeographic.com/news) because of the negative impact it 
has on sea-faring states as well as on those other states who directly or 
indirectly benefit from goods transported along international waterways.  
Piracy in Somalia is a great concern that world leaders and international 
organizations fear will lead to the collapse of maritime trade (International 
Maritime Organization, 2008: http//www.imo.org/TCD/ 
mainframe.asp/topic-id=1178) To forestall this, the European Union, for 
example, raised a naval force to fight piracy off the cost of Somalia (EU 
NAVFOR SOMALIA) (Consilium, 2009: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
showpage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en) which is christened “Operation Atalanta” 
(Wikipedia, 2009:http//en.widipedia.or/wiki/ Operation-Atalants).  Today, 
piracy still goes on though some may observe a reduction in its magnitude 
due to the use of military force. (Stares, 2009: 
http//www.iloydslist.com/11/news/operationatalanta-halves-risk-of-
hijacking).  But, one may ask: for how long will this international waterway 
be militarized?  What will be the cost, in real terms, of maintaining naval and 
or amphibious force in that sub region?  Available literature does not address 
these questions.  Even the EU looks at the issue as simply a matter of 
criminality.  But the overflow of domestic developments in Somali national 
life must be organically addressed to dissect the origin, course and character 
of piracy in that country in order to resolve effectively the menace off the 
coast of Somalia.  It is this issue that is the central concern of this paper. 
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Theoretical Framework 
When an issue is of global concern, idealist philosophy (Papp, 1984) tends to 
recommend a functionalist analysis and response to the problem.  Maritime 
brigandage in international waters prima facie runs foul of good conscience 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  At the level of the 
European Union, it seems to be a functionalist influence that gave rise to 
Operation Atalanta.  But this is not strictly the case.  Some non-EU member 
states have sent forces to the Gulf of Aden and the East African Coast.  Such 
countries include but not limited to Japan, Australia, Norway, China, Iran, 
India and Malaysia among others.  What drives nations to send naval forces 
to protect ocean trade in national interest?  This is clearly so for NATO 
member states like the United States and Greece among others.  Though less 
obvious for EU members, the mere fact that not all EU countries have sent 
warships to the Somali coast is indicative of interest articulation, taking 
cognizance of men, materials and finance as well as the ultimate benefit of an 
individual country’s naval capacity.  Consequently, the realist (Morgenthau, 
1948) theoretical framework will be used to analyze events, phenomena and 
literature appurtenant to this subject.  This is to prevent the obfuscation of 
issues and thereby treat interest aggregation as mere functionalist, and 
ultimately idealist, response to piracy.  It is realpolitik that delves deep into 
the heart of the interests of nations on the world stage; and, the strategic 
importance of international waters in that sub region brings out in clear relief 
the decision of nations to send warships, submarines frigates and air support 
to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia as being based on the national interest 
of the actors.  That the interests of maritime states coalesce to fight piracy in 
Somalia does not detract from clear-headed realism.  They have a common 
foe (casus foederis) in Somali pirates. 
Literature Review 
The currency of the challenge of piracy of Somalia has not given much time 
for highly scholarly response to marine thievery.  Consequently, the sources 
available are more often than not electronic through the instrumentality of the 
internet – the information super highway.  Relevant literature available on the 
World Wide Web cover piracy as a sore point in Somalia history and 
international shipping and such literature simply go ahead to suggest military 
option to stem the tide – operation Atalanta being a landmark in this policy 
option. 
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One significant contribution to the subject matter is Max Boot’s, (Boot, 2009: 
94-107).  He looks at piracy as a phenomenon as old as the mercantilist era 
following the age of discovery.  European nations condoned piracy in that era 
and sometimes secured the services of privateers to pillage Spanish ships 
transporting treasure back from the New World especially between 1520 and 
1789.  The piratical activities Francis Drake – late Sir Francis Drake – readily 
comes to mind in this regard.  The pirates were properly branded.  Pirates 
from England were known as “Elizabethan Seadogs”.  Those of Dutch origin 
were called “Beggars of the Sea” and those from France were christened 
French Buccaneers” (Abia and Scf, 2006: 8-35) Britain’s’ attitude to piracy 
changed when overseas trade became a primary source of the wealth of the 
British Empire (Boot, 2009: 94-107). Pirates became hostes humani generic, 
that is, common enemies of humanity.  Instead of being knighted as before, 
they were pursued and executed.  The measures that safeguarded the seas 
during the pirate wars (1650 to 1850) according to Boot were: “changing 
public attitudes, hiring primate pirate hunters, rooting out corruption, 
improving the administration of justice, offering pardon to pirates who 
voluntarily surrendered, increasing the number of naval ships dedicated to 
anti-piracy duty, cooperating with other nations, conveying merchant ships, 
blockading and bombarding pirate ports, chasing pirates both at sea and on 
land, and, finally, occupying and dismantling pirates lairs (Boot, 2009: 94-
107).  He therefore suggests the combination of these to subdue the modern 
day pirates that constitute a menace to maritime trade off the Somali coast. 
Open democracy (an international non-governmental organization) see piracy 
as a challenge to global governance (Open democracy, 
2008:http//www.opendemocracy.net/article/piracy-challenges-global-
governance) and therefore suggests zero tolerance for pirates as for terrorists.  
The zero-tolerance approach became necessary because piracy in Somalia 
threatens global trade while feeding domestic, pseudo-national and ethnic 
wars (Chattam House, 2008: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12203-
1008piracysomalia.pdf.). 
There is a common thread in all the literature: Piracy in Somalia is anathema 
to world trade, morality and good conscience and should therefore not be 
treated with kind gloves.  International legal and military action should be 
taken to stamp out this maritime scourge off the East African Coast.  The 
questions now are: why and how did Somalia acquire notoriety as a den of 
marine robbers?  What led the Somali people to piracy?  What is the driving 
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force of pirate psychology in Somalia?  Can a legal cum military onslaught 
alone bring and end to piracy in that sub region?  What other measures could 
be taken by the international community to permanently rid the Somali coast 
of pirates?  To answer these questions, it will be necessary to delve a little bit 
into the histor5y, politics and economy of Somalia as a country. 
Somalia:  A Historical Overview 
The republic of Somalia is a country located in the Horn of Africa – a region 
that lies northeast on the continent.  It is usually referred to as the eastern 
most state in Africa with a 637,540-square kilometre land mass (Wikipedia, 
2009: http://enviwikipedia.org/wiki/somalia). It has the longest coastline on 
the continent and its terrain consists mainly of plateaux, plains and highlands.  
The neighbours of Somalia are Ethiopia to the west, the Gulf of Aden with 
Yemen to the north, Kenya to the southwest and Djibouti to the northwest.  
Somalia is bounded in the East by the Indian Ocean where the already 
mentioned coastline is found. 
The capital of Somalia is Mogadishu famed for being the “city of Islam” in 
that part of the world and controlled the East African gold trade for several 
centuries (Wikipedia, 2009: http://enviwikipedia.org/ wiki/somalia).  The 
Berlin Conference of 1884-85 prevented European nations – mainly 
Germany, Italy and Britain – from fighting over the territory. The ethnic 
Somali are known for their creative fighting spirit which accounted for one of 
the longest colonial resistance wars ever (Wikipedia, 2009: 
http://enviwikipedia.org/wiki/somalia). But they succumbed only to aerial 
bombardment by Britain in the latter’s desire to accomplish her imperial 
ambitions for territories and bread. Having broken the resistance of a people 
who possessed not the sophistication of armament, the Somali were to find 
themselves under three different powers: Britain, France and Italy. Thus, we 
had French Somaliland (now Djibouti), British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland. 
It was the Union of British and Italian Somaliland that became the Republic 
of Somalia on July 1, 1960. Under that political union were covered inter-
clan rivalries occasioned in part by oppressive loyalties to erstwhile colonial 
overlords. These came to the fore with the assassination of Abdirashid Ali 
Shermarke (then President) in 1969. The military regime that took over the 
reigns of government was headed by General Siad Barre with a revolutionary 
orientation that was termed ‘socialist’. The Barre government embarked on 
extensive execution of public utilities, urban and rural mass literacy 
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campaign programmes. In fact, his programme recorded significant success. 
The mass literacy campaign for example, “helped to dramatically increase the 
literacy rate from 5% to 55% by the mid-1980s” (Wikipedia, 2009: 
http://enviwikipedia.org/wiki/somalia). Siad Barre was clearly popular in the 
eye of Ethnic Somali within Somalia and those living in Djibouti, Kenya and 
Ethiopia. 
In July 1976, the military government in Somali officially founded the 
Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). This categorically showed the 
Barre regime as pro-soviet during the cold war that characterized Post-World 
War II international relations. This singular act changed the nature and 
character of Somali politics. Several groups emerged in Somalia; some in 
clear opposition to Barre’s idiosyncrasies in power, while others emerged due 
to muted sponsorship of the United States and its Cold War allies – the 
industrialized capitalist countries of Western Europe. Some of the opposition 
groups were the Somali National Movement (SNM), Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). 
The formation of the SRSP by the military government in 1976 seriously 
entrenched what came to be known as “superpower rivalry in the Horn of 
Africa” in the sense that the East (led by the former Soviet Union) and the 
West (led by the United States) made frantic efforts to secure and maintain 
reliable and dependable spheres of influence in that strategic part of the 
African continent. The competition for the souls of nations in that region 
became very obvious in the Ogaden War and later in the Somali civil war. 
The remote cause of the Ogaden War was the desire of ethnic Somalis (in 
other countries due to European partition) to win the right of self-
determination. The immediate cause was the failure of diplomacy to secure 
the right of self-determination. Mogadishu engaged Addis Ababa without 
success. The Cadres of Western Somali’s Liberation Front (WSLF) later 
known as Ogadan National Liberation Front (ONLF) served as foot soldiers 
in the unsuccessful bid to capture the Ogaden region by force of arms from 
Ethiopia. The Soviet Union, being a friend to both nations sought to mediate 
a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Somalia. At that time, Ethiopia was 
indubitably an anathema to U.S. interest: a communist government was in 
power in Ethiopia. Not minding that populist and somewhat less ‘socialist’ 
military junta was ruling Somalia and that Somalia had earlier received 
military supplies too from Soviet Union, the United States strongly supported 
Somalia and sold modern weapons to her government. Egypt also supported 
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Somalia with millions of dollars in arms coupled with robust military training 
for ethnic Somali. At the end however, Somalia lost in the war with Ethiopia. 
The support of the Soviet Union and her allies for Ethiopia was more 
sustained. The U.S. loss of faith in the Somalia government is well beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
The defeat of Somalia in the Ogadan was had very serious consequences for 
the government and people of Somalia. The war crippled the economy. The 
citizens became impatient with the government became of the harsh realities 
of survival in Somalia. Government became increasingly iron-fisted to 
contain dissidence at all level. President Siad Barre was eventually ousted 
from office by clan-based forces from the north of Somalia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ somalia). 
All the political groups competed for power militarily. Even the ousted 
President Barre maintained his armed loyalists in the south of the country. 
Political competition by military means was pervasive. The situation has not 
changed to date except that there is a President: Sharaf Ahmed, and a Prime 
Minister, Omar Addirashid Ali Sharmarke 
(http://en.widipedia.or/wiki/operation-Atalanta) whose tenure we cannot say 
for how long they will last. 
The implication of the forgoing is a failed state – s state that is highly limited 
in its ability to provide basic services and also grossly incapable of 
discharging its responsibility in regard to eliciting its citizens compliance 
with international law and respect for treaty obligations. This is especially so 
because of the crass increase in arms and armed persons across the country. 
Agriculture was not only disrupted but arrested. Food distribution was 
invariably disclosed. When the citizens cannot find food onshore, they go 
fishing offshore. Unfortunately, international vessels stealing Somali fish 
smother the Somali fishing economy. The vessels “grab all the fish and leave 
the local fishermen empty-handed (Farah, 2009:35). Apart from illegal 
fishing by foreign trawlers, there is also the dumping of toxic waste off the 
coast of Somalis. This has also contributed to the depletion of fish stocks this 
worsening the plight of Somali fishermen. A good number of them were 
therefore left with one option: piracy off the Somali coast. 
It can be understood now that there is a relationship between superpower 
rivalry in the Horn of Africa and Somali politics as a failed state as a 
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relationship between state failure and thievery by international super trawlers 
and piracy along the East Africa cost of the Indian Ocean. 
Operation Atalanta and Piracy in Somalia 
The term “let’s go-a-fishing” means a different thing in Somalia. It has 
nothing to do with watchtower theology and the Master’s desire to transform 
local fishermen to fishers of me (The Holy Bible, Mark 1:16-20). It is rather 
the desire of Somali local fishermen to obey the first law basic to man: self-
preservation. Always going “back home with empty hands to their starving 
families” (Farah, 2009:35) was not a funny experience.  So piracy which is 
their response is a clear revolt against the international community that has 
condoned “the illegal fishing by international crew in Somali waters” (Ikken, 
2000:35-36).  It is this revolt aimed at attracting the attention of the world to 
the economic crime against the people of Somalia that is termed piracy by the 
international community. Indeed, piracy in Somalia has attracted attention to 
that part of the world but not the desired type of attention. It got a military 
attention for punitive purposes so that maritime trade can go on unimpeded 
off the Somalia coast. It was declared a “maritime security patrol Area” that 
needed a hunter approach through the setting up “Combined Task Force 
151(CTF – 151)” (Wikipedia, 2009: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/operation-
Atalanta). 
A significant response to piracy in Somalia is Operation Atalanta – a 
collective military campaign of the European Union to stop piracy off the 
Somali coast. The initial EU/NAVFOR SOMALIA was contributed to by 
Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden (Wikipedia, 2009: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/operation-Atalanta) 
with six warships and three reconnaissance planes 
(http://www.allheadlines.com/articles/7013319708). Operation Atalanta since 
its commencement in 2008 is formally dedicated to the Gulf of Aden and 
commanded by Rear Admiral, Philip Jones, Commander United Kingdom 
Maritime Forces, Headquarters in Northwood, England, This EU force is to 
treat Somali pirates as belligerents.  
The United Nations (UN) gave pep to the war on piracy in that region. The 
UN Security Council on June 2, 2008 passed a declaration authorizing 
maritime nations to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with pirates 
(www.undemocracy.com/meeting/s-PV-5902) but with a caveat that the 
declaration was not a blank cheque for such nations wishing to so pursue 
pirates to Somali waters must first have the agreement of the Transitional 
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Federal Government (TGF) in Somalia (www.undemocracy.com/meeting/s-
PV-5902). This was however a tacit indication that the government of 
Somalis lacks the capacity to safe-guard its territorial waters. This incapacity 
is characteristic of a failed state. 
As at 19 July 2009, there were 21 vessels in the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali 
coast (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/operation-atalanta). An interim 
assessment would give operation Atalanta a pass mark. According to Stares, 
the risk of hijacking merchant ships has been reduced by fifty percent 
(http//www.iloydslist.com/11/news/ operationatalanta-halves-risk-
ofhijacking). The most dramatic of all anti-piracy operation in the region in 
recent time is the release of Market Alabama (Boot, 2009:94-107). 
The operation was conducted with precision and clinical efficiency – a feat 
characteristic of the United States Navy. ‘This explains why Boot 
recommends “robust” military and legal resources” from maritime nations as 
a determining factor in curbing pirate menace in the Somalis (Boot, 2009:94-
107). Such responses should “stop short of actual occupation”. This is a clear 
realist approach to the application of power. It does not address the root 
causes of the problem – poverty and state failure – and therefore not likely to 
stamp out piracy in its entirety.  
The Need for a Diplomatic Option 
From our analysis so far, it is clear that piracy in Somalia is the response by 
Somali fisherman to over-fishing in Somali waters. This over-fishing as this 
study has established is the handiwork of foreign fishermen whose trawlers 
illegally fish in Somali territorial waters. Illegal fishing in Somali territorial 
waters is made possible by the inability of the state of Somalia to protect its 
territorial waters. This study has also shown that dwindling catch by Somali 
fishermen is also due to the dumping of toxic waste off the coast of Somalia 
by foreign countries. Again, the state of Somalia lacks the capacity to stop 
this illegal activity off its territorial waters. Faced with starvation Somali 
fishermen have no option than to resort to piracy in order to survive. This as 
this study have established is the root cause of piracy in Somalia. 
This study has established that the response of the international community 
has been directed to the effect and not the cause of the problem. Measures 
like Operation Atalanta and the U.S. rescue of Maersk Alabama constitute a 
palliative and not a cure. The solution to piracy in Somalia requires 
negotiation. The international community has to use diplomacy to rebuild the 
Piracy in Somalia and Operation Atalanta: The need for a Diplomatic Option 
 
Copyright © IAARR, 2010: www.afrrevjo.com  570 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
Somali state so that it can enforce law and order on shore and protect its 
territorial waters. To achieve this, the UN should help to stop factional 
fighting in Somali and help to establish a functional Navy for Somalia. 
The international community should also use diplomacy to stop all forms of 
illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Somali waters. Similarly, diplomacy 
should also be used to stop dumping of waste along the East African Coast. 
In a manner consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
international community should set up a task force to arrest and try all vessels 
engaged in illegal fishing off the coast of Somali or dumping toxic waste 
therein. This measure will increase the fish stock in Somali waters so that 
fishermen in Somali can earn a living by harvesting the sea. 
Finally, the international community should compensate Somali fishermen 
for the loss they have suffered due to the reduction of their stock arising out 
of illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping in Somali waters. 
Conclusion 
Piracy in Somali is a challenge to all sea-faring nations. The root cause of the 
matter is the inability of the state of Somali to stop illegal fishing and the 
dumping of toxic waste off its territorial waters. 
This had led to a depletion of the fish stock in Somali waster and the inability 
of Somali fishermen to earn a living from harvesting the sea. Hence they 
resorted to piracy. 
The response of the international committee, through Operation Atalanta has 
been directed at the effect of the problem. 
Our thesis in this article is that the international community should opt for 
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